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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Clayton Adams appeals following the district court’s denial of his motion for credit 
for time served.  Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his 
motion requesting credit for time served on his aggravated battery sentence.  When 
Mr. Adams was sentenced in 2007, the aggravated battery sentence was ordered to be 
served consecutively to the second degree murder sentence, but the second degree 
murder sentence was subsequently vacated by the district court as part of Mr. Adams’ 
post-conviction relief.  When that sentence was vacated, the consecutive nature of his 
sentences ended as there was no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be 
consecutive to.  At Mr. Adams’ re-sentencing on the second degree murder charge in 
2014, the district court did not specify whether the new second degree murder sentence 
was consecutive to, or concurrent to, the aggravated battery charge.  Thus, the 
sentences are concurrent and Mr. Adams is owed credit for time served for the 
aggravated battery conviction. 
 This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s contentions that the district 
court did not vacate the sentence for second degree murder and that the consecutive 
nature of the aggravated battery survived the second degree murder re-sentencing.  
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in 
Mr. Adams’ Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 






The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Adams’ Motion For Credit For Time Served 
 
 Mr. Adams asserts that the district court erred when it denied his request for 
credit for time served.  Although Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated 
battery was initially ordered to run consecutively to the conviction for second degree 
murder when he was sentenced in 2007, the consecutive nature of his sentences 
vanished when his second degree murder sentence was vacated.  Upon his 
resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the second degree murder 
sentence was consecutive to the aggravated battery; thus, the sentences are 
concurrent and Mr. Adams should receive credit for time served on both cases.   
 The State claims that the second degree murder sentence1 was never “vacated.”  
(Respondent’s Brief, p.6, n.2.)  Notably, Mr. Adams did not claim that the record 
contains an order that uses the word “vacated”; however, even if we use the word 
“terminated” or “set aside” in lieu of the word “vacated”, the effect is the same.  See 
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (definition of vacate as “to nullify or cancel; make 
void; invalidate”.)  The sentence for second degree murder went away, when the district 
court ordered a re-sentencing.  The sentence was not being corrected, he was being 
sentenced anew.  Common sense tells us that two sentences for the same offense 
cannot exist simultaneously.  By operation of necessity the old sentence was vacated 
when the district court ordered re-sentencing, whether the district court used the word 
“vacated” or not.  That is, in order to re-sentence someone, the initial sentence must go 
                                            
1 The State correctly points out that “[t]he second degree murder charge was never 
vacated.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.7.)  Appellant’s brief did incorrectly refer to the 
sentence as a charge.  See Appellant’s Brief, p.9. 
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away.  See, i.e., U.S. Maxwell, 590 F.3d 585, 590 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bye, J., dissenting, 
“[i]t is axiomatic that there could not be re-sentencings without the vacation of the 
‘original’ terms of imprisonment”). 
The State argues that Mr. Adams’ “sentence for aggravated battery has 
consistently remained consecutive to his sentence for second degree murder” 
(Respondent’s Brief, p.6); however, such a claim ignores the necessity of the district 
court first setting aside, vacating, terminating, etc., the second degree murder sentence 
and ordering re-sentencing on that count only.  Even if second degree murder sentence 
was merely “set aside,” this would still mean it had ceased to exist, and a sentence that 
does not exist cannot be consecutive to anything or have another sentence continue to 
be consecutive to it. 
Further, the State’s argument misunderstands the meaning of a consecutive 
sentence.  In quoting the district court’s language ordering “said sentences ‘to run 
consecutively’” (Respondent’s Brief, p.7), the State supposes that the meaning of 
“consecutive sentence” is reciprocal, not a word meaning “[t]wo or more sentences of 
jail time to be served in sequence” (Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014)) and logic 
dictates that one sentence must be served first, for the second to follow consecutively.  
(See R., p.30.) 
The State argues that Idaho Code § 18-308 is applicable (Respondent’s Brief, 
p.8); however, by the plain language of that statute it only applies before sentence has 
been pronounced upon the defendant for either sentence.  See State v. Clapper, 143 
Idaho 338, 341 (2006) (holding that I.C. § 18-308 did not apply where sentence in case 
no. 02-4630 was announced two years before the terms of probation were ordered to 
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run consecutive to the previous sentence).2  This was no longer the circumstance here, 
where the sentence first imposed was set aside/vacated. 
 In its order denying Mr. Adams motion for credit for time served, the district court 
relies on State v. Dreier, 139 Idaho 246 (Ct. App. 2003) (R., p.66); however, the Dreier 
Court held that the judgment of conviction was ambiguous because it was unclear in 
what order the consecutive sentences were to be served.  139 Idaho at 254.  Unlike the 
sentences in Dreier, Mr. Adams’ sentence in Count I, second degree murder, was 
imposed first in open court, and was identified as the first sentence in the written 
judgment of conviction.  (5/8/07 Tr., p.112, L.24 – p.113, L.13; R., pp.33-34.)  The 
sentence on the second count, the aggravated battery, was therefore consecutive to the 
second degree murder sentence.  (R., pp.33-34.)  Unlike Dreier, the original oral 
pronouncement of Mr. Adams’ sentences were consistent with the original written 
judgment of conviction.   
Dreier is helpful to Mr. Adams’ argument in that the Court of Appeals found the 
sentences were unclear and must be remanded because the written judgment was 
inconsistent with the oral pronouncement as to which sentence would be served first.  
Id.  Such a holding confirms Mr. Adams argument that, when sentencing a defendant to 
                                            
2 The Idaho Court of Appeals in Clapper analyzed the propriety of a consecutive 
sentence, holding that the trial court had common-law authority to impose cumulative 
sentences and that I.C. § 18-308 was not intended to abrogate or limit the common law 
rule and only applied to cases within its scope.  Id. at 341.  Thus, while the district court 
had the authority under the common law to order the second degree murder sentence 
to be consecutive to the aggravated battery sentence, it did not do so when it re-
sentenced Mr. Adams. 
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consecutive sentences, one sentence must be imposed first, then the next sentence is 
consecutive to that.3  One follows the other in sequence.   
In 2007, Mr. Adams’ sentence on the conviction for aggravated battery was 
ordered to be served consecutive to the conviction for second degree murder.  When 
the first sentence for second degree murder was vacated, the consecutive nature of his 
sentences vanished as there was no sentence to which the aggravated battery could be 
consecutive.  Upon his resentencing in 2014, the district court did not specify that the 
second degree murder was consecutive to the aggravated battery; thus, the sentences 
are concurrent. 
   
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court remand his case with an order for 
the district court to issue a corrected Amended Judgment of Conviction which clarifies 
that the sentences are to be served concurrently, and which gives Mr. Adams the 
requisite credit for time served on the aggravated battery sentence. 
 DATED this 25th day of October, 2016. 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      SALLY J. COOLEY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                            
3 To the extent this Court might decide the district court’s language in the initial 
judgment was unclear in that the court used the language “to run consecutively,” the 
Ninth Circuit analyzed similar language in Rice v. United States, 7 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 
1925), and held that a judgment setting forth the sentence on each count followed by 
the phrase “to run consecutively” was sufficiently definite.  7 F.2d at 321 (holding that 
the judgment was sufficiently definite as to the order of sequence in which the 
sentences were to be served, because the word “consecutively” was used as equivalent 
to “successively,” “succeeding one another in regular order;” that is to say, the term of 
imprisonment on the first count was to be first served, and then the term of 
imprisonment on the second count was to “succeed" or "come after.”). 
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